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Based on the experience from other countries, within the well-established legal system, the 
national model, private model, and the public-private partnership model could all become the 
operation approach to the public enterprises. Therefore, we shall dedicate ourselves to the 
construction of public enterprises with a comprehensive model, which is an integration of the 
state-owned model, public-private model and private-owned model with the state-owned and 
the public-private models mainly included. In the process of constructing the comprehensive 
model, the public interest shall be guaranteed, for the core of the public enterprise is in the 
feature of providing public goods and services instead of the ownership. Besides, competitive 
neutrality shall be kept as the foundation so as to attract private capital to the supplying of 
public goods and services. Finally, in the comprehensive model construction, laws and 
regulations should serve as the guarantee, because only when the law is put into force can the 
reform be carried out with good reason. 
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Public enterprises refer to those that specially provide public goods and services to the public. 
Its main characteristics are as follows: a state usually implements its economic policies and 
economic plans through public enterprises; public enterprises have the obligation to assume 
public responsibility, including the provision of public goods and services at a reasonable price 
as well as the provision of employment opportunities for the public; public enterprises mostly 
belong to such industries as the water, electricity, gas, oil, telecommunications, and 
transportation, also public enterprises are mainly in the fields which provide public 
infrastructure and other social services on behalf of the government. 
At present, the enterprises in China that provide public goods and services for the public are 
basically state-owned ones. In other words, in the current China, public enterprises are all state-
owned enterprises. But across the world, public enterprises can be operated in a variety of ways 
of ownership. There are mainly three ways: the first is to operate in the form of solely state-
owned enterprises or solely state-owned companies, such as Tennessee Valley Authority, an 
enterprise that provides electricity for the public in the United States, and Caledonian 
MacBrayne, a company of passenger and vehicle ferries in the United Kingdom. The second is 
to operate in a public-private partnership, such as water supply services for residents in most 
states of the United States, waste disposal, road lighting, and other public services in the United 
Kingdom. The third is to operate in the form of privatization, such as the current enterprises of 
water supply, electricity, telecommunications in the United Kingdom. From the extraterritorial 
experience, we can learn that as long as external regulation and internal governance are 
implemented scientifically, the above three paths can all fulfill good expectations. 
China has implemented series of reforms on state-owned enterprises recently. In 2013, a new 
round of reform was carried out, thus the calls to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises 
have been on the rise. In 2015, the State Council of China issued a series of documents, 
focusing on the classification reform of state-owned enterprises and the vigorous development 
of mixed ownership economy. The central government clearly pointed out that there were six 
ways of mixed ownership reform including the participation of non-state-owned capital, 
collective ownership capital, foreign capital, public-private partnership (PPP), etc. The 
operation mode of state-owned enterprises in China is undergoing positive and profound 
changes. Accordingly, Chinese public enterprises will inevitably not be all state-owned 
enterprises. 
Considering the specific situation of a large number of state-owned enterprises in China, it is 
appropriate for public enterprises to adopt the comprehensive model, which is an integration of 
the state-owned model, public-private model and private-owned model with the state-owned 
and the public-private models mainly included. In the current situation, we should adhere to the 
following three key elements in terms of the construction of such a comprehensive model by 
taking into account the advanced experience of foreign countries, especially the UK and the US. 
1. TAKING PUBLIC INTEREST PROTECTION AS THE PRINCIPLE 
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In the construction process of public enterprises with a comprehensive model, one principle 
should be clearly defined, that is, public enterprises should ensure the public interest in the 
process of operation, which is determined by the nature of public enterprises. As for the public 
enterprises, safeguarding the public interest must be a basic principle whether it is through 
nationalization, public-private partnership or privatization. 
1.1 Interpretation of public interest 
Despite the fact that the term "public interest" has been frequently mentioned in the discourse 
of politics, law, and economics, there is still no uniform concept at present. When discussing 
public interest, people often focus on the government authorities, regulatory agencies and some 
self-regulatory organizations, and examine the impact of the regulation activities on the entities 
they regulate. 
Generally, the public interest is based on the same interests of most subjects in a certain social 
context under some specific social conditions. Therefore, public interest theory emphasizes 
more on the supervision of the government. The public interest theory holds that there are 
defects in the market, which are mainly manifested in such aspects as monopolies, information 
asymmetry, imperfect competition, and uncertainty. In order to correct market failure, the 
government has the obligation to intervene directly in the behavior of economic subjects 
through a series of policies and regulations so that the public interest can be safeguarded. 
However, the government cannot represent the public interest, for the beneficiaries of the 
public interest are the uncertain majority. The constitutionalism of the times serves as the 
highest principle to judge the public interest (Hu, 2008:60-63).  
When it comes to the public interest, people often think of public choice and confuse these two 
terms, for they both begin with “public”. However, they actually differ greatly in meanings. 
Public choice is the application of market economy logic in the decision-making process, which 
is based on the pursuit of private interests. Therefore, the public choice theory holds that only 
through the exercise of private choice can it serve the overall welfare best (Feintuck, 2014:11). 
The public interest focuses on the realization of the value of citizenship equality through 
institutions and law, which is of vital importance for the protection of democratic values. The 
public interest of the people needs to be ensured not only in the case of nationalization, but also 
in the case of privatization, and even more attention needs to be paid in the situation of the 
latter. As Feintuck put it, "Even where privatization occurs, regulation over the exercisers of 
power on the basis of public interest remains as necessary as under the nationalization system" 
(Feintuck, 2014:23). In the absence of responsibility, if the power is unrestricted, no matter 
who has the unrestricted power, it is a great threat to the public interest. Even if deregulation is 
the trend for the countries today, there still exists a regulatory framework aimed at protecting 
the interests of specific citizenship in the public enterprises that provide public goods and 
services. Therefore, commercial activities in these areas and even the profitability of companies 
will be limited to a certain extent. Feintuck also concludes that it is appropriate to use the 
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concept of the public interest on the following three premises: (1) when there is an antagonism 
between the general public and special interest groups; (2) when this antagonism falls within 
the scope of internal issues of the state; (3) when the issue arises in areas where the government 
is really capable of exercising its power (Feintuck, 2014:31). Hence, on the premise of ensuring 
that the term "public interest" is not abused and misused, society must protect the public 
interest of its citizens. 
1.2 Reasons for ensuring the public interest for public enterprises and the 
measures 
There is a consensus that social products and services can be divided into two categories: 
private goods and services and public goods and services. Private goods and services are 
generally provided by commercial enterprises with only macroeconomic regulation and control 
from the government. But public goods and services such as water, electricity, gas, 
transportation, railways, communications, and public infrastructure are different because they 
are provided for the whole society, with all members being beneficiaries. Once public goods 
and services appear, every person in the social group can enjoy them without being excluded. 
Anyone who used certain public goods and services will not affect the use of other people. This 
characteristic of public goods and services defines the essential attributes of public enterprises. 
Public enterprise is an enterprise organization that provides public goods and services to the 
public, and it essentially serves the public. The root reason for its existence is to enable the 
public to carry out normal social activities instead of seeking profiteering through market 
behavior. 
Public enterprises are fundamentally different from commercial enterprises and even other 
general state-owned enterprises. Commercial enterprises pursue profit-making justifiably, and 
the general state-owned enterprises put economic benefits, value preservation and value 
increase in the first place, which is also consistent with its nature. However, different from the 
above, public enterprises bear a series of such responsibilities as implementing national 
economic policies and plans, adjusting the balance of macroeconomic development, resolving 
market failures, and enhancing social equity. Since public enterprises are usually in 
monopolistic industries, they need to be regulated and controlled by the state, but this does not 
mean that they must be solely owned by the state. Private owned, private holdings, and public-
private partnership can all be the operation mode of public enterprises. However, no matter 
what operation mode it is, public enterprises must assume social responsibilities with far higher 
requirements than commercial enterprises. When providing public goods and services for the 
public, public enterprises must strive to improve the quality and standardize public 
infrastructure and service market (Li, 2006:64-66). Public enterprises must take ensuring public 
interest as the fundamental principle. 
But in reality, the state-owned enterprises that are functionally equivalent to public enterprises 
in China fail to take ensuring public interest as the primary principle, which happens from time 
to time. By taking gasoline as an example, the gasoline price has risen rapidly in recent years. It 
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is common to see that ordinary people remind each other to fill up the car fuel tank at night 
because the price will rise again the next day. It can be seen that although public enterprises 
should regard ensuring the public interest as the basic principle, they seldom take the initiative 
to assume social responsibility, and society should not regard ensuring public interest as the 
self-restraint of public enterprises only. 
In order to ensure the satisfaction of the public interest, the following two points should be 
made clear: through legislation to specify in what aspects public enterprises should satisfy the 
public interest and in which way, and what penalties will be imposed for violations of this 
principle; through government's regulation to ensure that the public enterprises closely related 
to people’s daily life do provide public goods and services in a fair and just manner (He, 
2008:99-101). In fact, relevant rules have been formulated in China, such as Price Law of the 
People's Republic of China, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of 
Consumer Rights and Interests, Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Company Law of the People's Republic of China and so forth. However, unclear rules lead to 
weak feasibility. 
By contrast, the UK and the US have a clear rule of ensuring the public interest for public 
enterprises in law. As stipulated in the Electricity Act 1957, local electricity bureaus in the UK 
have to set a price ceiling for the electricity they provide. If the fees charged by individuals 
who resell the electricity exceed the price ceiling, the excess amount must be returned to the 
local electricity bureau (Electricity Act 1957. Sec. 29). Telecommunications Act 1981 provides 
that once the Secretary of State considers that certain activities of British Telecommunications 
are harmful to national security, he may issue directives to British Telecommunications and its 
subsidiaries to cease them immediately (British Telecommunications Act 1981. CH.38. 
Sec.7,8). Tennessee Valley Authority Act stipulates that when the board of directors enters into 
a contract for the electricity sale with a private enterprise or an individual and the aim is to seek 
profit, the contract must include two clauses: once the state, county or city has a demand for the 
above-mentioned electricity, the board of directors has the right to cancel the contract; when the 
private enterprises resell the electricity purchased from Tennessee Valley Authority to the end 
consumers, the prices shall not be higher than those set by the board of directors of Tennessee 
Valley Authority (16 U.S.C.A. Chapter 12A. Section 831n-4(f), Section 831i, Section 831k, 
Section 831l). In this way, Tennessee Valley Authority has been supplying electricity to people 
in the seven states of the southeastern US at prices below the national average. 
Obviously, all the above examples reflect the restrictions of the laws of the UK and the US on 
state-owned public enterprises, but this does not mean that the laws of the UK and the US only 
attach importance to the protection of public interest under the path of nationalization. In fact, 
the protection of the public interest under the path of privatization is more prominent in the law. 
Golden share can serve as an example. The government, as the holder of golden shares, retains 
veto power over major decisions that affect the company, including mergers and acquisitions, 
disposal of major assets, and the entry or exit of a certain business area, etc. On the one hand, 
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the British government ensures that private enterprises which are of strategic significance to the 
state are controlled by domestic enterprises rather than foreign enterprises; on the other hand, it 
ensures that the state-owned enterprises will not cease the provision of basic public goods and 
services if they become private enterprises (Omarova, 2017:1043-1047). 
Telecommunications Act 1984 stipulates that the law must ensure that the public can afford the 
price of telecommunications services. Meanwhile, it stipulates that the Secretary of State can 
issue a general directive to the company’s legal persons who must implement the directive, as 
long as he considers it to be beneficial to national security. Water Act 1989 stipulates that 
private water supply enterprises and wastewater treatment enterprises shall not terminate the 
provision of services without authorization (Water Act 1989. CH.15. Sec.4,11,14). Electricity 
Act 1989 prescribes that ministers must protect the interests of the people who are supplied 
with electricity by private electricity companies, and special attention must be paid to checking 
the price and service quality of these companies (Electricity Act 1989. CH.29. Sec.3).  
Meanwhile, it stipulates that if the electricity price of private electricity companies, which has 
been defined, exceeds the upper limit, the excess part must be returned to the customers. 
Telecommunications Act 1984 also stipulates that if such acts as false statements, tampering 
with or destroying documents occur, the telecommunications companies will be punished 
(Telecommunications Act 1984. CH.12. Sec.53). The above examples reflect the protection of 
the public interest by law after the privatization of public enterprises. To some extent, 
privatization is a better way to provide goods and services with the help of market forces, but 
the profit-seeking nature of the market requires us to ensure that the operation of the market 
does not “result in or aggravate the inequalities in the aspect of people’s expectations of 
enjoying citizenship” (Feintuck, 2014:77) when we provide public goods and services by using 
market tools. It requires the materialization of the legal system.  
Public enterprises in the UK and the US protect the public interest of the citizens with perfect 
mechanism, whether in the stage of nationalization or privatization. The protection is not based 
on the self-discipline of public enterprises but on a well-established system. Therefore, it is also 
necessary for us to strictly check and control the legal system so as to protect the public 
interests from being neglected and damaged. 
2. TAKING COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY AS THE FOUNDATION 
In the provision of public goods and services, in recent years the UK and the US mainly meet 
the needs of the public through the use of private capital in the form of privatized public 
enterprises or the cooperation between the public sector and the private sector. It also serves as 
the main way to provide public goods and services for the public at present and in the future. 
The participation of private enterprises in the supply of public goods and services is one of the 
important parts of China’s public enterprises with a comprehensive model. Whether private 
enterprises are willing to participate depends on whether the government adopts a fair and just 
attitude in administration and supervision to a large extent. Such an attitude is competitive 
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neutrality. Under the current context of the vigorous development of the mixed ownership 
economy in China, competitive neutrality is of particular importance, which has a direct effect 
on the participation extent of private enterprises and the quality of achieving the public interest. 
2.1 Competitive neutrality policy and its evolution  
Competitive neutrality policy originates from Australia, and it advocates that no commercial 
entity has natural advantages or disadvantages simply because of its ownership. Since 1993, 
Australia has begun to carry out corporation reformation for state-owned enterprises. But it is 
found in Hilmer Report of 1993 that although the corporatized state-owned enterprises were 
subject to competition law, they still enjoyed a dominant position in cost and pricing, etc. 
because of the preferential policies of the government. When state-owned enterprises were 
exempted from tax or subsidized, there would be distortions in the market (Hilmer Report, 
1993). Hilmer Report also found that when problems arose within the government, it was more 
effective to deal with them through a mechanism before the event, which led to the introduction 
of a competitive neutrality policy by the Australian government in 1995. It aimed to eliminate 
market distortions which resulted from the government’s protection of state-owned enterprises. 
Competitive neutrality policy applies to the following situations: where there is a market; to the 
behavior of large government enterprises (especially when the profits are huge); to 
governments at all levels; when the benefits of implementing the policy are greater than the 
costs. 
The main components of competitive neutrality policy are tax neutrality, debt neutrality, 
regulatory neutrality, reasonable commercial return, and price reflecting the cost. Particularly in 
terms of debt neutrality and regulatory neutrality, competitive neutrality policy emphasizes that 
state-owned enterprises should have the same lending rate as their competitors and that state-
owned enterprises should not be in a regulatory environment different from that of their 
competitors (Healey, 2012:9-11). 
In addition to the requirement of Australia, Article 106 of the EU Act stipulates that services 
provided by state-owned enterprises or by private enterprises representing the government shall 
be subject to the competition provisions of the EC treaty unless the application of these treaties 
impedes the obligations entrusted to them by law (Article 106 EC European Community).  
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) was the first international 
organization to initiate competitive neutrality research. OECD believes that competition law 
alone cannot ensure fair competition between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, 
especially in those newly-opened public fields. OECD also holds the belief that it is very 
important to ensure fair competition between state-owned monopoly enterprises and private 
enterprises that newly enter the market (Tang et al., 2013:58-59). Therefore, it has established a 
research framework for competitive neutrality. 
On the one hand, the framework focuses on reforming the competition environment of state-
owned enterprises and private enterprises, advocating that the legislative environment and law 
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enforcement environment should be systematically reviewed and reformed in the operation and 
management of state-owned enterprises, so as to make the environment the same as that of 
private enterprises; on the other hand, it aims at improving the transparency and sense of 
responsibility of state-owned enterprises, and minimizing the competitive advantages enjoyed 
by state-owned enterprises to promote effective competition. OECD believes that besides the 
mechanism before the event adopted by Australia, competitive neutrality should also include a 
mechanism after the event, which can monitor the implementation and efficiency of the 
competitive neutrality framework and correct any possible disputes. Moreover, OECD believes 
that the root cause of the competitive neutrality issue is worth analyzing. If the competition 
distortions result from the government’s subjective intention to give preferential treatment to all 
state-owned enterprises, publicity may be the most effective way, which can make the public 
widely aware of this problem. However, if competition distortions are unintentional, which 
result from the government’s failure to anticipate the possible consequences of carrying out the 
policies, transparent rules and targeted competitive neutrality policies will be more effective 
(OECD, 2011:11-13). 
2.2 The lack of competitive neutrality in China 
At present, although China is actively promoting the reform of mixed ownership, there are 
many examples of deviation from competitive neutrality. Take PPP as an example (the 
cooperation model between the public sector and the private sector), the government, and state-
owned public enterprises represent the public sector in the UK and the US, and the private 
sector is represented by private enterprises. Private capital is introduced into the supply of 
public goods and services through the cooperation between the public sector and the private 
sector in the UK and the US, which is also China’s original intention to promote the PPP model. 
But PPP changed its nature after being introduced to China. First of all, the scope of the public 
sector has narrowed down, in which only the government represents the public sector. It can be 
accepted, though reluctantly. After all, the government belongs to the public sector. However, 
the representatives of the private sector are often replaced by state-owned enterprises. How 
could the state-owned enterprises become the private sector? In that case, the PPP in China is 
the cooperation between the government and state-owned enterprises on quite a large scale, 
which deviates from the name of PPP and the practices in the UK, the US, and even the 
international community. As Chen said, state-owned enterprises have become the main force in 
the PPP upsurge. Despite the intention to attract private capital, state-owned enterprises rush in, 
which is a strange phenomenon after having vigorously promoted the PPP model since four 
years ago in China (Chen, 2018). 
Taking salt as another example, the enterprises that produce and sell salt belong to public 
enterprises, and they are public welfare state-owned enterprises in the current classification in 
China. But the salt sold on the market is mostly iodized salt, and many Chinese people suffer 
from thyroid nodules. Since the situation differs in different regions in China, not all residents 
in different regions need to get additional iodine. However, due to the lack of competition for 
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public welfare state-owned enterprises, there is no need for salt enterprises to consider the 
needs of those who do not lack iodine or the people who suffer from thyroid nodules. If the 
private enterprises participate in the salt industry, the problem may not exist at all. 
Since the new round of reform, the participation of private enterprises in the mixed ownership 
system has not met the expectation. The reasons are the low enthusiasm for participation in the 
subjective aspect and the high threshold for participation in the objective aspect, which reflect a 
common problem in depth: the lack of competitive neutrality policies in China. According to 
the relevant survey conducted by the Shanghai Municipal Government in 2018, 51.50% of the 
private enterprises think that the threshold for participating in PPP projects, major strategic 
projects of the state and Shanghai is too high; 39.52% of private enterprises think that the 
openness and fairness of government bidding are insufficient; some chambers of commerce say 
that SMEs are often excluded from government procurement activities because most of them 
cannot satisfy the requirements for qualification or performance imposed in bidding documents.  
2.3 Countermeasures  
Song and Liu believe that the main reasons for the lack of motivation of private enterprises in 
the reform of mixed ownership can be summarized as follows: the difficulty for small-scale 
ones to assume main responsibility, the upstream industry being controlled, the lack of 
institutional guarantee, difficulty in withdrawal implementation (Song et al., 2014:107-119). A 
large proportion of these reasons belong to competitive neutrality. As for the above example of 
PPP, governments at all levels are competing to develop the PPP model in this round of reform 
of mixed ownership with pragmatism as the starting point. Since PPP is only used as a tool to 
resolve the issue on the shortage of public financial input and its role in improving the 
efficiency of public services has not been fully recognized, the introduction of competition 
mechanism has been completely ignored (Chen, 2016:148). In order to solve this problem, the 
government should focus on optimizing the business environment, making the business 
environment safe, fair and efficient so as to increase the participation willingness of private 
enterprises. 
First, the government must treat state-owned enterprises and private enterprises equally. The 
purpose of adopting a competitive neutrality policy is not to suppress state-owned enterprises 
and government power, but to strive to create a fair market environment in which the 
government has such an impartial attitude that private enterprises and state-owned enterprises 
can have the opportunity to stand on the same platform for equal competition. Competitive 
neutrality, which accords with the law of market economy development, is constructive to 
enhancing market vitality (Tang et al., 2013:58). It is true that state-owned enterprises are 
obliged to provide public goods and services that private enterprises are unwilling to provide to 
the public, but monopoly provision of public goods and services by state-owned enterprises 
will inevitably result in inefficiency. At present, the supply of public goods and services in 
China is far from enough to meet the needs of the public in both quantity and quality. 
Introducing the competitive mechanism into the field of public goods and services will 
Cambridge Journal of China Studies 
25 
definitely improve the production and service efficiency of state-owned enterprises and the 
social well-being (Hu, 2014:168). There is a good reason to do that.  Moreover, if the 
government monopolizes a large number of resources through administration, not only are the 
problems of resource waste and inefficiency prominent but also the private capital has to get 
close to the authority by all means because of its limited space, which will lead to money-
power transactions, rent-seeking behavior and even more serious social problems. It can be 
seen that competitive neutrality is of great importance for the development of the mixed 
ownership economy at present in China.  
In fact, competitive neutrality is important not only at present. In the long run, China's public 
enterprises will include both state-owned public enterprises and private public enterprises, and 
it is of vital significance whether the government can fairly treat the two public enterprises that 
have different ownership structures. If the government can treat the two types of public 
enterprises equally, fairly and openly, not only will the private public enterprises be cultivated, 
but also it will enable the public to get better public goods and services. On the contrary, if the 
government blindly makes the policy more beneficial for state-owned public enterprises and 
regulates the two kinds of public enterprises with two different standards, it will not only 
strangle private public enterprises but also reduce the quality of public goods and services. 
Telecommunications Act 1984 stipulates that the Secretary of State and the 
Telecommunications Governor shall promote effective competition in the commercial conduct 
of telecommunications services. In order to promote necessary competition in the domestic 
electricity market, Electricity Act 1989 clearly stipulates that the electricity supply governor 
must cooperate with the anti-monopoly committee to take relevant necessary measures and 
must focus on those actions that restrict, distort and hinder competition in electricity generation, 
supply, and transmission (Electricity Act 1989.CH.29.Sec.43). Tennessee Valley Authority Act 
stipulates that when purchasing goods and services, an enterprise must follow the publication 
procedure and make the publication period long enough to ensure smooth competition. 
It can be seen that the UK and the US have long been aware of the significance of maintaining 
a fair market environment. At present, we must establish a review system for fair competition, 
which will prohibit the abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition 
(Wang, 2016:11-13). What exactly should we do? For the implementation of competitive 
neutrality policy, OECD holds that three channels should be mainly adopted, which are also 
applicable to China: (1) legislation should be adopted to specify the criteria that state-owned 
enterprises should abide by when they compete with private enterprises; (2) state-owned 
enterprises are required to abide by the obligations of the competitive neutrality through the 
administrative mechanism.  (3) A formal complaint handling agency is set up for investigating 
cases of the failure of state-owned enterprises to comply with competitive neutrality, and for 
taking remedial measures accordingly (OECD, 2011:11-13). 
In the process of approaching competitive neutrality, in addition to requiring the government to 
treat state-owned enterprises and private enterprises equally, the government also needs to 
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further transform its work functions by striving for less intervention and providing more 
services. In fact, since 2013, the service ability and efficiency of Chinese governments at all 
levels have been relatively improved, but there are still some deficiencies. In the aspect of the 
policy management process, the instructions are still not clear enough, and private enterprises 
often do not know which department it is or how to use the instructions; since the information 
disclosure and process disclosure are still not specific enough and the disclosure scope is too 
limited, it is still difficult for private enterprises to find the information; the expectation of one-
website dealing is still not realized (one-website dealing refers to all the things related can be 
dealt through one website only), since the system is not coordinated and it is difficult to share 
the data in all aspects, and the relevant departments still have to provide one set online and 
another set offline, which have greatly affected the administrative efficiency of the government. 
To examine the systems of the UK and the US, the power boundary of the government and the 
autonomy fields of enterprises are clearly defined, and transparency is clearly demanded. The 
UK HM Treasury specifically stipulates that all government's approval of projects must be 
transparent in procedures and detailed in steps, and it must be ensured that any individual can 
have access to relevant information on the approval inquiry website. Meanwhile, it is stipulated 
that the government shall summarize all the projects of infrastructure investment and 
government construction planning, and provide the information to the private sector regularly 
so that the private sector can further understand the future planning of government-funded 
construction projects. Taking this as a lesson, Chinese government must further deepen the 
reform of streamlining administration, delegating power and optimizing service. Breakthroughs 
can be made in such aspects as the reform of project management and information share so as 
to speed up the implementation of the one-website dealing. The government is supposed to 
achieve the high efficiency as soon as possible, where the examination and approval can be 
carried out “only once” with even “no meeting” at all. The reform of the administrative 
examination and approval system will continue to be deepened so as to reduce procedures and 
avoid repetition, thus optimizing the administrative service process and clearing the bottleneck 
of the system and mechanism. Only in this way can the competitive neutrality be embodied 
truly and can the private capital be attracted to the supply of public goods and services. 
3. TAKING LEGAL SYSTEM AS THE GUARANTEE 
Vito Tanzi commented that when the market fails, the government tends to rely too much on 
the public sector by replacing the market with public sector activities instead of trying to avoid 
market failure. Through research it can be found that in many cases market failure results from 
the government’s indulgence in these markets, thus creating an environment that leads to 
market failure. Therefore, the government should make effort to avoid market failure, rather 
than repair or correct the market after the event, which is supposed to be the fundamental issue 
for the government to perform its economic functions. As to this issue, one of the most 
important tools is the legal framework. A clear legal framework will accurately define the 
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market economy and describe the market failure behavior that must be corrected (Tanzi, 
2014:350-352). 
In this round of state-owned enterprise reform, the government has issued policy documents 
intensively and frequently. We can see China’s determination and attitude to this round of 
reform from the upper level. Unfortunately, this round of reform lacks the necessary legal 
support and some policies lack strong operability. For example, such expressions as “to 
strengthen” and “to improve” can be read frequently, but what specific operation can be applied 
“to strengthen and improve” has not been followed up in the document. Consequently, the 
grass-roots departments are not clear about the specific implementation methods, thus making 
the document becoming an empty slogan. In addition, on the premise of strengthening the 
operability of policies, we should improve the stability of policies so as to give people 
expectations; moreover, we should also strive to transform feasible policies into laws and make 
sure laws must be issued without deficiencies. 
3.1 Promulgating the public enterprise law 
After classifying state-owned enterprises and positioning public enterprises, a prominent 
problem is which law should be applied to public enterprises. At present, Law of the People's 
Republic of China of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the People, Law of the People's Republic 
of China on the State-owned Assets of Enterprises and Law of the People's Republic of China 
on State-owned Assets Management are obviously applicable to state-owned enterprises instead 
of public enterprises, for state-owned enterprises and public enterprises are not the same and 
not all state-owned enterprises are public enterprises. Moreover, compared with the water, 
electricity and telecommunications acts of the UK, such laws and regulations of some 
industries in China as Water Law of the People's Republic of China (2016 Amendment) and 
Electric Power Law of the People's Republic of China (2015 Amendment) fail to specify a 
series of issues like how water, electricity and telecommunications enterprises, etc. satisfy the 
public interest, how to ensure that they provide non-profit public goods and services, how to 
regulate these enterprises, especially when these enterprises sell shares. Therefore, it is 
necessary for China to promulgate the public enterprise law first. 
Learning the experience of the UK and the US, the United States has formulated a Government 
Corporation Control Act for all public enterprises in the federation, which has been revised 
every several years. The states of the US have also formulated state laws to regulate state and 
local public enterprises. In addition to the unified legislation on public enterprises, the US also 
has specially legislated on all public enterprises in certain fields. For example, Tennessee 
Valley Authority Act is a special law that Tennessee Valley Authority of the United States has 
to abide by in addition to Government Corporation Control Act. 
Unlike the US, the UK has no unified legislation on domestic public enterprises, but it adopts 
the one-to-one approach to make special legislation on specialized fields. It has promulgated 
Water Act, Electricity Act, Telecommunications Act, Natural Gas Act and other laws for 
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special fields successively. Specific measures for nationalization or privatization of the above-
mentioned industries are also reflected in the revision of various laws. For example, in the stage 
of nationalization of public enterprises, the Electricity Act of the UK clearly stipulates the 
specific legal requirements for the realization of macro-control functions, the effective use of 
state funds and the full implementation of social responsibility. In the stage of privatization of 
public enterprises, Electricity Act also clearly specifies detailed requirements including what 
special directives the government can make, the limit of the government's equity in private 
enterprises, and the information disclosure of enterprises etc. to ensure the public interest. 
The legislative mode of the public enterprise law in China will be determined by the national 
conditions. In view of a large number of public enterprises, respective legislation will lead to 
the high cost (Li, 2006:48-51), and the identity of public enterprises in nature will result in the 
repetition and waste by the respective legislation. Therefore, China should first formulate a 
unified Public Enterprise Law. Meanwhile, Public Enterprise Law in China should take into 
account the possible involvement of private capital in public enterprises in the future. Thus, 
China's Public Enterprise Law should incorporate both state-owned public enterprises and 
private public enterprises in the legislation (Gu, 2013). 
3.2 Legislation should be sustainable 
The United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development pointed out that the 
law of a country and even the whole international community often lags behind the 
development of the situation, and the legal system is often left behind the rapid development of 
the economy and life, so we should uphold the concept of sustainable development. Sustainable 
development applies to all areas of social life, and both the current development and future 
development must be taken into account. In the new round of state-owned enterprise reform in 
China, amendments and legislation of relevant laws must be carried out from the perspective of 
sustainable development. Legislators must be forward-looking, and the enactment of laws must 
be examined and verified in many ways instead of being rushed out blindly and having to be 
revised constantly in the near future. 
The sustainable development of law-making in the UK and the US deserves our study. Greater 
London Authority Act 1999 stipulates the clauses on the insolvency of PPP project companies. 
At that time, the PPP model was in its infancy in the UK, and there were few insolvency 
precedents. However, Greater London Authority Act 1999 foresaw the possibility of the future, 
which stipulated in detail that PPP companies shall not declare dissolution on their own; the 
application for dissolution of PPP companies must be submitted by the mayor himself; 
otherwise, the court will dismiss it. (Greater London Authority Act 1999. Part IV, CH.VII. 
Sec.221-223). Years later, the UK has promulgated the PPP Administration Order Rules 2007, 
the legal provision on the insolvency procedure of the PPP company. It is more specific than 
that in 1999, and there is a smooth link between the two laws. Apart from Greater London 
Authority Act 1999, from the first enactment of Government Corporation Control Act in 1945 
to its amendment in 2013, there are few revisions to the articles of law. The main revision 
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content is reflected in the scope change of government corporations. The above sustainable 
legislation development of the UK and the US is worthy of our reference. When China revises 
and promulgates relevant laws for a new round of state-owned enterprise reform later, 
legislators should take a sustainable development attitude and carefully analyze the current and 
future problems that may be faced instead of rushing things out.  
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